Getting an 'ought' from an 'is'
A connection between fallibilism and morality
Fallibilism is the assumption that people can make mistakes and that all ideas are open to revision – including ideas that are widely assumed to be beyond doubt. An example of such an idea is Newtonian mechanics, which survived extensive empirical testing and critical examination for roughly three centuries until it was disproven by Einstein in the early 20th century.
Fallibilism is an epistemological theory, but the implications of fallibilism extend beyond the realm of epistemology to include morality, although this often goes unrecognised. Consider, for example, someone who rejects the idea that there are objective moral truths – a position known as moral nihilism. A moral nihilist who accepts fallibilism must acknowledge that his belief that there are no objective moral truths may be incorrect. This means he must be open to the possibility that objective moral truths exist and that he may be making a moral error by not adhering to that objective morality.
As a result of this recognition that moral truths might exist, a fallibilist must recognise the importance of discussions about moral issues. If the moral nihilist closed himself off to such discussions, he would tacitly assume that he is infallible with regard to moral truths, contradicting fallibilism.
Engaging in discussions about morality is, therefore, a moral imperative for a fallibilist because the fallibilist acknowledges that he might be wrong in his beliefs and that he can only uncover and correct his mistaken theories by critically examining them. Hence, fallibilism and moral nihilism are incompatible because fallibilism has implications for how people should behave: a fallibilist should commit to specific moral values, like allowing for critical discussions with those who have different moral views.
If people close themselves off from criticism, they will inevitably entrench errors – including moral errors – and the fact that morality might exist is enough to make this morally problematic. Hence, we have obtained an ‘ought’ (i.e. we ought to encourage discussion) from an ‘is’ (i.e. people are fallible).
Reading for the first time about 'fallibilism' I am under the impression that this line of thinking belongs to a classical-liberal mindset of reason that responds positively to self-criticism, along with the notion that people can redeem themselves. In a moral framework I would argue that the concept of forgiveness is aligned with fallibillism.
What I find is the progressive side of our society, once an adherant of free speech and open discussion, is now prone to moral relativism/moral nihilism and additionally is setting up a social landscape where redemption for made mistakes is rare. Being fallible is a grave sin, abstractly even. The fear of being labelled fallible governs our public debate.
Thus I would like to argue that consequently moral nihilism and fallibillism are commonly not found together within ones mindset. Rather, people who are proponents of moral nihilism apply wide measures of 'double-think' (reference to 1984), where multiple contradictory ideas are carefully upheld by means of social acceptability - i.e.: not being fallible.
What I understand from your argument is that you are commenting on the hypocrisy of groups that claim moral superiority by simultaneously denying that there is such a thing as moral absoluteness. And that such a mentality will almost always risk resulting in moral depravity.
The conclusion you draw is that there is an axioma "People are fallible" which requires "we ought to encourage discussion" and you imply that this condition is currently not met, hence the frustration.
Do these thoughts resonate with the message that you are trying to convey?
King regards,
your mate from uni :D
As a fellow Popper fan, the problem I see with this is the person who rejects objective morality denies that moral statements have any truth value. They are essentially statement of preference. So, they are not saying that their moral views cannot be wrong; they are saying they are neither right nor wrong.
Perhaps the argument might work better if applied to meta-ethics rather than to ethics.