Reading for the first time about 'fallibilism' I am under the impression that this line of thinking belongs to a classical-liberal mindset of reason that responds positively to self-criticism, along with the notion that people can redeem themselves. In a moral framework I would argue that the concept of forgiveness is aligned with fallibillism.
What I find is the progressive side of our society, once an adherant of free speech and open discussion, is now prone to moral relativism/moral nihilism and additionally is setting up a social landscape where redemption for made mistakes is rare. Being fallible is a grave sin, abstractly even. The fear of being labelled fallible governs our public debate.
Thus I would like to argue that consequently moral nihilism and fallibillism are commonly not found together within ones mindset. Rather, people who are proponents of moral nihilism apply wide measures of 'double-think' (reference to 1984), where multiple contradictory ideas are carefully upheld by means of social acceptability - i.e.: not being fallible.
What I understand from your argument is that you are commenting on the hypocrisy of groups that claim moral superiority by simultaneously denying that there is such a thing as moral absoluteness. And that such a mentality will almost always risk resulting in moral depravity.
The conclusion you draw is that there is an axioma "People are fallible" which requires "we ought to encourage discussion" and you imply that this condition is currently not met, hence the frustration.
Do these thoughts resonate with the message that you are trying to convey?
I've been meaning to reply to your message for ever. Sorry for the delayed response. It was heartening to see my uni mate reply to a blog I wrote. :) I agree with basically everything you wrote here, and it aligns well with what I express in the blog. The moral nihilist I mentioned in the blog wasn't necessarily based on anything current, but moral nihilism does seem to be a prevalent theory at the moment—one that I strongly object to. Fallibilism and the moral values it implies, like forgiveness, are sadly rejected by many.
As a fellow Popper fan, the problem I see with this is the person who rejects objective morality denies that moral statements have any truth value. They are essentially statement of preference. So, they are not saying that their moral views cannot be wrong; they are saying they are neither right nor wrong.
Perhaps the argument might work better if applied to meta-ethics rather than to ethics.
That’s not necessary for my argument. All that’s needed is the existence of a normative ethical theory (whether true or false) that states there is an objective morality (e.g. utilitarianism). This automatically creates an obligation on the part of the fallibilist to allow for discussions about morality.
If the fallibilist doesn’t do so, he would entrench errors. And being wrong about objective morality would be a mistake if objective morality exists.
Reading for the first time about 'fallibilism' I am under the impression that this line of thinking belongs to a classical-liberal mindset of reason that responds positively to self-criticism, along with the notion that people can redeem themselves. In a moral framework I would argue that the concept of forgiveness is aligned with fallibillism.
What I find is the progressive side of our society, once an adherant of free speech and open discussion, is now prone to moral relativism/moral nihilism and additionally is setting up a social landscape where redemption for made mistakes is rare. Being fallible is a grave sin, abstractly even. The fear of being labelled fallible governs our public debate.
Thus I would like to argue that consequently moral nihilism and fallibillism are commonly not found together within ones mindset. Rather, people who are proponents of moral nihilism apply wide measures of 'double-think' (reference to 1984), where multiple contradictory ideas are carefully upheld by means of social acceptability - i.e.: not being fallible.
What I understand from your argument is that you are commenting on the hypocrisy of groups that claim moral superiority by simultaneously denying that there is such a thing as moral absoluteness. And that such a mentality will almost always risk resulting in moral depravity.
The conclusion you draw is that there is an axioma "People are fallible" which requires "we ought to encourage discussion" and you imply that this condition is currently not met, hence the frustration.
Do these thoughts resonate with the message that you are trying to convey?
King regards,
your mate from uni :D
I've been meaning to reply to your message for ever. Sorry for the delayed response. It was heartening to see my uni mate reply to a blog I wrote. :) I agree with basically everything you wrote here, and it aligns well with what I express in the blog. The moral nihilist I mentioned in the blog wasn't necessarily based on anything current, but moral nihilism does seem to be a prevalent theory at the moment—one that I strongly object to. Fallibilism and the moral values it implies, like forgiveness, are sadly rejected by many.
As a fellow Popper fan, the problem I see with this is the person who rejects objective morality denies that moral statements have any truth value. They are essentially statement of preference. So, they are not saying that their moral views cannot be wrong; they are saying they are neither right nor wrong.
Perhaps the argument might work better if applied to meta-ethics rather than to ethics.
That’s not necessary for my argument. All that’s needed is the existence of a normative ethical theory (whether true or false) that states there is an objective morality (e.g. utilitarianism). This automatically creates an obligation on the part of the fallibilist to allow for discussions about morality.
If the fallibilist doesn’t do so, he would entrench errors. And being wrong about objective morality would be a mistake if objective morality exists.